Contributors

Friday, August 30, 2019

Jeffra v. California State Lottery

A plaintiff’s complaint of retaliation arose from protected activity where the plaintiff alleged his employer engaged in a pretextual investigation of him after he filed a whistleblower complaint.

Jeffra v. California State Lottery - filed Aug. 29, 2016, Second District, Div. Eight 
Cite as 2019 S.O.S. 2368 

For more information, go to: 

Thursday, August 29, 2019

OTO, LLC v. Kho

An agreement to arbitrate wage disputes can be enforceable so long as it provides an accessible and affordable process for resolving those disputes; even if a litigation-like arbitration procedure could be an acceptable process, an employee may not be coerced or misled into accepting this trade.

OTO, LLC v. Kho - filed Aug. 29, 2019 
Cite as 2019 S.O.S. 2266 

For more information, go to: 

Rodriguez v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.

Petitioner Josafat Rodriguez, Jr. is a veteran of the Gulf War, and served as a police officer for the City of Santa Cruz (“City”) from 1995 until 2007.  He applied for industrial disability retirement in 2011 with the California Public Employee’s Retirement System (“PERS” or “CalPERS”) based on his diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) that was caused in part by his work for the City.

The City disputed whether Rodriguez was entitled to disability retirement through six- and one-half years of litigation resulting in two opinions from this Court that ultimately confirmed Rodriguez’s right to the retirement allowance.  (Rodriguez v. City of Santa Cruz (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1443 (Rodriguez I); Rodriguez v. City of Santa Cruz (Sept. 22, 2016, H042280) [nonpub. opn.] (Rodriguez II).)

Following this Court’s decision in Rodriguez II, the City granted Rodriguez disability retirement, but denied his claim of industrial causation, and he began to receive benefits on December 1, 2016.  Rodriguez then requested a finding that his disability was industrial from the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (“WCAB” or “Board”) on April 25, 2017.  The Board concluded that Rodriguez’s disability was industrial, but that he was barred from receiving industrial disability retirement benefits because his claim for a finding of industrial causation was untimely under the five-year time limitation set forth in Government Code section 21171.

We find that Rodriguez’s claim for industrial causation was timely.  We therefore annul the Board’s decision. 

For more information, go to: 

Franco v. Greystone Ridge Condominium

In March 2018, employees of defendant Greystone Ridge Condominium (Greystone), including plaintiff Victor M. Quiroz Franco (plaintiff), were presented with and asked to sign an agreement requiring that each employee agree to submit to final and binding arbitration “[a]ny and all claims . . . relating to any aspect of . . . employment with Employer (pre-hire through post-termination).”  About 10 days later, plaintiff filed a complaint against Greystone, C & A Services, John Stokke, and Maher A.A. Azer (defendants) asserting employment-related claims.  Two days after that, plaintiff signed the arbitration agreement and returned it to Greystone.  Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s claims which plaintiff opposed on the ground the arbitration agreement failed to expressly state that claims that had already accrued, including the claims asserted in plaintiff’s complaint, were subject to arbitration.  The trial court agreed with plaintiff and denied the motion to compel arbitration.

We reverse.  The parties’ arbitration agreement is clear, explicit, and unequivocal with regard to the claims subject to it and contains no qualifying language limiting its applicability to claims that had yet to accrue.  On the contrary, the agreement’s reference to claims relating to “pre-hire” matters expresses an intent to cover all claims, regardless of when they accrued, that are not otherwise expressly excluded by the arbitration agreement. 

For more information, go to: 

Monday, August 26, 2019

Ray v. County of Los Angeles

The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying a defendant county’s motion to dismiss, on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, a putative collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act; reversed the district court’s order regarding the putative collective period; and remanded.

Plaintiff homecare providers were employed through California’s In-Home Supportive Services program, which is implemented and run by the State and its counties. In October 2013, the Department of Labor promulgated a new rule providing that homecare providers would be entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA. The final rule had an effective date of January 1, 2015. In 2014, the District Court for the District of Columbia vacated the rule. On August 21, 2015, the D.C. Circuit reversed and ordered the district court to enter summary judgment for the Department of Labor. On September 14, 2015, the Department of Labor announced that it would not bring enforcement actions against any employer for violations of the new rule for 30 days after issuance of the mandate of the D.C. Circuit. On October 27, 2015, the Department of Labor said it would not begin enforcing the new rule until November 12, 2015. The State began paying overtime wages on February 1, 2016.

Affirming in part, the panel held that the County of Los Angeles was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The panel assumed without deciding that a county might be entitled to immunity if acting as an arm of the state. The panel held that, under the five-part Mitchell test, the County was not an arm of the State when it administered the IHSS program because the state-treasury factor, which is the most important, and all but one of the other Mitchell factors weighed against immunity. The panel held that a later Supreme Court case, Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994), did not undermine Mitchell such that it should be overruled.

Reversing in part, the panel held that the effective date of the Department of Labor’s rule was January 1, 2015, because the legal effect of the D.C. Circuit’s vacatur was to reinstate the original effective date. The panel held that the Department of Labor’s choice against enforcing the rule until November 12, 2015, did not eliminate the availability of private rights of action until that date. Accordingly, the beginning of the putative collective period was January 1, 2015.

For more information, go to: 

Tuesday, August 20, 2019

Murray v. Mayo Clinic

A plaintiff bringing a disability discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. §12112 must show that an adverse employment action would not have occurred but for the disability.

Murray v. Mayo Clinic - filed Aug. 20, 2019 
Cite as 2019 S.O.S. 17-16803 

For more information, go to: 

Dorman v. The Charles Schwab Corporation

ERISA claims can be subject to mandatory arbitration.

Dorman v. The Charles Schwab Corporation - filed Aug. 20, 2019 
Cite as 2019 S.O.S. 18-15281

For more information, go to: 

Valtierra v. Medtronic Inc.

Even if a worker’s impairment can qualify as an impairment under the Americans with Disabilities Act, he could not establish a viable disability discrimination claim where he could not show a causal connection between his impairment and his termination.

Valtierra v. Medtronic Inc. - filed Aug. 20, 2019 
Cite as 2019 S.O.S. 17-15282 

For more information, go to: 

Thursday, August 15, 2019

Voris v. Lampert

An employee cannot assert a conversion claim based on the nonpayment of wages.

Voris v. Lampert - filed Aug. 15, 2019 
Cite as 2019 S.O.S. 3989 

For more information, go to:
http://www.beverlyhillsimmigrationlaw.com

Clifford v. Quest Software Inc.

The question posed in this appeal is whether an employee’s claim against his employer for unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (the UCL) is arbitrable.  The employee brought various wage and hour claims against his employer, and the employer moved to compel arbitration based on the parties’ arbitration agreement.  The trial court granted the motion in part and ordered to arbitration every cause of action except the employee’s UCL claim, which the court concluded was not arbitrable.  In so ruling, the court cited without discussion our Supreme Court’s holding in Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 303 (Cruz).

We reverse that portion of the trial court’s order.  Assuming Cruz remains good law — a question we need not answer here — Cruz at most stands for the proposition that UCL claims for “public” injunctive relief are not arbitrable.  (Cruz, supra, at pp. 315-316.)  Cruz does not bar arbitration of a UCL claim for private injunctive relief or restitution, which is precisely what the UCL claim here seeks.  The employee’s UCL claim therefore is subject to arbitration, along with his other causes of action. 

For more information, go to:

Wednesday, August 14, 2019

​ Mejia v. Merchants Building Maintenance

Defendants Merchants Building Maintenance, LLC and Merchants Building Maintenance Company (the MBM defendants) appeal from an order of the trial court denying their joint motion to compel arbitration.  The MBM defendants moved to compel arbitration of a portion of plaintiff Loren Mejia's cause of action brought against them for various violations of the Labor Code under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.).

Pursuant to PAGA, "an 'aggrieved employee' may bring a civil action personally and on behalf of other current or former employees to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations.  (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (a).)"  (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 (Arias).)  A PAGA claim "is not a dispute between an employer and an employee arising out of their contractual relationship.  It is a dispute between an employer and the state, which alleges directly or through its agents—either the [Labor and Workforce Development] Agency or aggrieved employees—that the employer has violated the Labor Code."  (Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 386–387 (Iskanian).)  In Iskanian, the Supreme Court held that individual employees cannot contractually agree to arbitrate or waive any predispute PAGA claims, but they may agree to arbitrate their "individual damages claims."  (Iskanian, supra, at p. 387.)

The MDM defendants moved to compel arbitration of that portion of Mejia's PAGA claim in which she seeks "an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages" pursuant to section 558.  Section 558 provides in relevant part:

"(a) Any employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer who violates, or causes to be violated, a section of this chapter or any provision regulating hours and days of work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission shall be subject to a civil penalty as follows:

"(1) For any initial violation, fifty dollars ($50) for each underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee was underpaid in addition to an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages.

 "(2) For each subsequent violation, one hundred dollars ($100) for each underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee was underpaid in addition to an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages.

"(3) Wages recovered pursuant to this section shall be paid to the affected employee.

"[¶] . . . [¶]

"(d) The civil penalties provided for in this section are in addition to any other civil or criminal penalty provided by law."  (§558, subds. (a), (d).)

The MBM defendants contend that Mejia's claim to recover the portion of the penalty under section 558 that represents underpaid wages amounts to a claim for individual damages because it seeks "victim-specific relief," given that section 558 provides that any amount recovered representing the amount of underpaid wages are to be directed to "the affected employee."  The MBM defendants further contend that because Mejia agreed to arbitrate any individual claim that she may have to her unpaid wages, any claim that she asserts seeking the amount that is sufficient to recover underpaid wages under section 558 must be separated from the remainder of the PAGA claim and sent to arbitration.  The MBM defendants maintain that only that portion of Mejia's claim brought pursuant to section 558 in which she seeks to recover the $50 or $100 per violation per employee civil penalty on behalf of herself and other aggrieved employees may be brought by an individual plaintiff as a representative PAGA claim that is not subject to arbitration.

The question presented in this case has been framed by other courts as a question as to whether a single PAGA claim seeking recovery of the civil penalty provided for in section 558 may be "split" in the way that the MBM defendants suggest.  In other words, may a court split a single PAGA claim so as to require a representative employee to arbitrate that aspect of the claim in which the plaintiff seeks to recover the portion of the penalty that represents the amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages where the representative employee has agreed to arbitrate her individual wage claims, while at the same time retain in the judicial forum that aspect of the employee's claim in which the plaintiff seeks to recover the additional $50 or $100 penalties provided for in section 558 for each violation of the wage requirements?  Appellate courts are divided on this question.  (Compare Esparza v. KS Industries, L.P. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1228 [concluding that claim for unpaid or underpaid wages under section 558 involves "victim-specific relief" and is subject to arbitration where employee has agreed to arbitrate private claims] with Lawson v. ZB, N.A. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 705, 724 (Lawson) [concluding that court may not split a PAGA claim seeking recovery of civil penalties under section 558 in order to send the portion seeking section 558 unpaid or underpaid wages penalties to arbitration because section 558 provides "no private right of action and by its terms is only enforceable by the LWDA"] and Zakaryan v. The Men's Wearhouse, Inc. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 659, 672 (Zakaryan) [concluding that court may not split a PAGA claim seeking recovery of civil penalties under section 558 in order to send the portion seeking section 558 underpaid wages penalties to arbitration because "an individual PAGA plaintiff is at all times acting on behalf of the [Labor and Workforce Development Agency (the Agency)] when seeking underpaid wages as well as the $50/$100 penalty," such that "his pursuit of both remedies 'involv[es] the same parties seek[ing] compensation for the same harm' and thus involves 'the same primary right' "].)  The issue is pending before the Supreme Court in Lawson, supra, review granted Mar. 21, 2018, S246711.

We agree with the conclusion of the Lawson and Zakaryan courts on this question, and conclude that a single PAGA claim seeking to recover section 558 civil penalties may not be "split" between that portion of the claim seeking an "amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages" and that portion of the claim seeking the $50 or $100 per-violation, per-pay-period assessment imposed for each wage violation. The result is that an employee bringing a PAGA claim to recover the civil penalties identified in section 558 may not be compelled to arbitrate that portion of her PAGA claim that seeks an amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages pursuant to that statute, while the rest of the claim that seeks the $50 or $100 per-pay-period per violation portion of the penalty remains in a judicial forum.  We therefore affirm the trial court's order denying the MDM defendants' motion to compel arbitration in this case.

For more information, go to: 

Thursday, August 8, 2019

Scott v. City of San Diego

In 2015, San Diego Police Department Sergeant Arthur Scott sued the City of San Diego (City), alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq. (FEHA)).  Scott rejected a $7,000 offer to compromise made by the City under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 and proceeded to trial, where the City prevailed.  The trial court awarded the City a total of $51,946.96 in costs incurred after it served its Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, even though the trial court had found that plaintiff's FEHA claims were not frivolous.  While this appeal was pending, the Legislature amended FEHA's cost provision statute to specifically state that, notwithstanding section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a prevailing defendant may not recover attorney fees and costs against a plaintiff asserting non-frivolous FEHA claims.  (See Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 955, § 5, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.)  We conclude that, with this amendment, the Legislature sought to clarify existing law, rather than to change it.  "A statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law is properly applied to transactions predating its enactment."  (Carter v. California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922 (Carter).)  We therefore apply the amended statute here and reverse the trial court's award of costs to the City. 

For more information, go to: 

Thursday, August 1, 2019

Robles v. Employment Development Department

Assuming the other Code of Civil Procedure §1021.5 criteria are met, a fee award will be appropriate except where the expected value of the litigant’s own monetary award exceeds by a substantial margin the actual litigation costs; the making of new law is not a prerequisite to a fee award under §1021.5.

Robles v. Employment Development Department - filed July 31, 2019, First District, Div. Four 
Cite as 2019 S.O.S. 3708 

For more information, go to: 

L'Chaim House, Inc. v. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement

Plaintiffs L’Chaim House, Inc. and its owner, Cary Kopstein (collectively, L’Chaim), operate residential care homes for seniors.  L’Chaim was cited for wage and hour violations by defendant Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE).  After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, L’Chaim initiated this action by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, which the trial court denied.

On appeal, L’Chaim claims that under the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) wage order, it may require its employees to work “on-duty” meal periods that, unlike periods when employees are “relieved of all duty,” do not need to be at least 30 minutes long.  (IWC wage order No. 5-2001 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050) (hereafter Wage Order No. 5), subd. (11)(A), (E).)  We hold that, to the contrary, L’Chaim must provide meal periods of at least 30 minutes, regardless of whether they are on-duty or off-duty, under Wage Order No. 5 and the applicable statutory law.  We therefore affirm.

For more information, go to: