CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese

The U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals erred in applying a series of inferences it laid out in a 1983 case called International Union, United Auto, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Yard-Man that were later rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in order to find that a collective bargaining agreement was ambiguous. A contract is not ambiguous unless it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and the 6th Circuit's "Yard-Man inferences" cannot generate a reasonable interpretation because they are not "ordinary principles of contract law."

CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese - filed Feb. 20, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 17-515_2c83

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Terris v. Co. of Santa Barbara

Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311 holds that public employees must pursue appropriate internal administrative remedies before filing a civil action against their employer.  Labor Code section 244 does not require a litigant to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a civil action.   Here we hold section 244 applies only to claims before the Labor Commissioner.  It has no effect on the Campbell rule.
          
Plaintiff Shawn Terris appeals a summary judgment in favor of her former employer, defendant County of Santa Barbara (County), in her wrongful termination action.  We conclude, among other things, that:  1) Terris did not exhaust her administrative remedies on her claims that the County terminated her job to discriminate against her in violation of sections 1101, 1102, and 1102.5; [[2) there are no triable issues of fact on Terris’s claim that she was terminated because of her sexual orientation (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a), Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA));]] but 3) the trial court erred by awarding the County costs on the FEHA cause of action.  We affirm in part and reverse in part.

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Kenny v. Wal-Mart Stores

The panel vacated the district court’s order remanding a putative class action to California state court because the district court exceeded its statutory authority in remanding sua sponte based on a non-jurisdictional defect, and because Wal-Mart did not waive its right to remove the action to federal court; and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff filed the putative class action in California state court, challenging Wal-Mart’s policy requiring employees who have suffered workplace-related injuries to submit to drug and/or urine testing. Wal-Mart removed the case to federal court based on jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). The district court sua sponte remanded the action to state court, concluding that Wal-Mart had waived its right to remove the case by filing a demurrer in response to plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in state court.

The panel held that the district court lacked authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to remand sua sponte based on a non-jurisdictional defect.

The panel noted that a defendant “may waive the right to remove to federal court where, after it is apparent that the case is removable, the defendant takes actions in state court that manifest his or her intent to have the matter adjudicated there, and to abandon his or her right to a federal forum.” Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d 1230, 1240 (9th Cir. 1994). The panel held that the district court erred in concluding that Wal-Mart waived its right to remove the case when the FAC did not reveal a basis for removal pursuant to CAFA. The panel also held that Wal-Mart’s choice to file a demurrer, rather than another form of responsive pleading, to plaintiff’s indeterminate FAC did not amount to a waiver of its right to remove. The panel further held that where Wal-Mart removed the case before plaintiff opposed the demurrer and before any hearing was held, clearly Wal-Mart did not manifest an intent to litigate in state court.

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O'Malley v. Hospitality Staffing Solutions

A negligent undertaking claim could not be subjected to dismissal on summary judgment where it was possible for a reasonable trier to fact to find that a hotel had assumed a duty to have an employee check on a guest and there was a dispute as to whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the guest was incapacitated and needed assistance.

O'Malley v. Hospitality Staffing Solutions - filed Jan. 31, 2018, Fourth District, Div. Three
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 574

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Lampe v. Queen of the Valley Medical Center

A trial court can deny class certification if the plaintiffs are seeking certification for classes that were not identified in the operative complaint. A trial judge properly denied certification of a class of workers whose overtime wages were allegedly based on improper calculations of their regular rate of pay where the workers failed to demonstrate what items were or were not included in the regular rate calculation, or any details as to why any of the items should or should not be included. Without such evidence, the judge could not determine if there was an ascertainable and numerous class with a defined community of interest. A trial judge properly denied class certification for a group of workers who claimed their employer had required them to leave work early since an individualized assessment was necessary to determine who left at the employer's request, and who voluntarily left. A trial judge properly denied class certification for a group of workers who claimed they were denied timely meal breaks because it would require individualized inquiries to determine which workers did not take breaks and why.

Lampe v. Queen of the Valley Medical Center - filed Jan. 2, 2018, publication ordered Jan. 23, 2018, First District, Div. Four
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 420

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Arave v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce etc.

An employee's letter to his former employer was properly treated as an admission against interest instead of an attempt to compromise where the letter does not concede any wrongdoing, but simply sets out his accusations of discrimination and his maximal claim. Even if the letter were an offer to compromise, its admission was not prejudicial since the factual claims in the letter were consistent with the evidence the employee put on at trial, and the proposed resolution was consistent with the expert testimony presented by the employee to establish his damages. A judge's comments expressing frustration with counsel's inefficient manner of questioning a witness were not the sort of comment that demonstrate a negative personal view concerning counsel that would deprive a party of a fair trial. A judge has discretion to guide the trial, direct counsel to allow witnesses to finish their answers, and direct counsel to cut to the chase in questions and away from needless complicated setups. The judge erred in awarding costs and expert witness fees to an employer who prevailed on a worker's discrimination claims under Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 998(c)(1) where the judge found the claims were not frivolous.

Arave v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce etc. - filed Jan. 23, 2018, Fourth District, Div. Two
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 397

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In re Hyundai and Kia Fuel Economy Litigation

When a group of plaintiffs brings a nationwide class action under the Class Action Fairness Act in California, the district court is required to apply California's choice of law rules to determine whether California law could apply to all plaintiffs in the nationwide class, or whether the court had to apply the law of each state, and if so, whether variations in state law prevented common issues from predominating in the litigation. The standard for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is not lessened in a settlement context.

In re Hyundai and Kia Fuel Economy Litigation - filed Jan. 23, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 15-56014

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