Friday, February 23, 2018

Area 51 Productions v. City of Alameda

A plaintiff's cause of action against a city for reneging on a long-standing arrangement to license an area for the plaintiff to hold private events does not arise from a protected activity for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. While conduct alleged to constitute breach of contract may qualify as constitutionally protected speech or petitioning, communicative acts that are merely collateral to a claim or evidence that may be probative of a breach do not qualify as protected speech. The anti-SLAPP statute can apply to the expressive conduct of individual representatives of a government body who are being sued for actions they took on behalf of that government body. Under Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 425.16(e)(2), the pendency of an issue before a government body is a proxy for its character as public in nature.

Area 51 Productions v. City of Alameda - filed Feb. 20, 2018, First District, Div. Four
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 826

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Wednesday, February 21, 2018

Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers

Endeavoring to root out corporate fraud, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). Both Acts shield whistleblowers from retaliation, but they differ in important respects. Sarbanes-Oxley applies to all “employees” who report misconduct to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission), any other federal agency, Congress, or an internal supervisor. 18 U. S. C. §1514A(a)(1). Dodd-Frank defines a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.” 15 U. S. C. §78u– 6(a)(6). A whistleblower so defined is eligible for an award if original information provided to the SEC leads to a successful enforcement action. §78u–6(b)–(g). And he or she is protected from retaliation in three situations, see §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii), including for “making disclosures that are required or protected under” Sarbanes-Oxley or other specified laws, §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provision contains an administrative-exhaustion requirement and a 180-day administrative complaint-filing deadline, see 18 U. S. C. §1514A(b)(1)(A), (2)(D), whereas Dodd-Frank permits a whistleblower to sue an employer directly in federal district court, with a default six-year limitation period, see §78u–6(h)(1)(B)(i), (iii)(I)(aa).

The SEC’s regulations implementing the Dodd-Frank provision contain two discrete whistleblower definitions. For purposes of the award program, Rule 21F–2 requires a whistleblower to “provide the Commission with information” relating to possible securities-law violations. 17 CFR §240.21F–2(a)(1). For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections, however, the Rule does not require SEC reporting. See §240.21F–2(b)(1)(i)–(ii).

Respondent Paul Somers alleges that petitioner Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (Digital Realty) terminated his employment shortly after he reported to senior management suspected securities-law violations by the company. Somers filed suit, alleging, inter alia, a claim of whistleblower retaliation under Dodd-Frank. Digital Realty moved to dismiss that claim on the ground that Somers was not a whistleblower under §78u–6(h) because he did not alert the SEC prior to his termination. The District Court denied the motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals concluded that §78u–6(h) does not necessitate recourse to the SEC prior to gaining “whistleblower” status, and it accorded deference to the SEC’s regulation under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837.

Held: Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision does not extend to an individual, like Somers, who has not reported a violation of the securities laws to the SEC. Pp. 9–19.

(a) A statute’s explicit definition must be followed, even if it varies from a term’s ordinary meaning. Burgess v. United States, 553 U. S. 124, 130. Section 78u–6(a) instructs that the statute’s definition of “whistleblower” “shall apply” “[i]n this section,” that is, throughout §78u–6. The Court must therefore interpret the term “whistleblower” in §78u–6(h), the anti-retaliation provision, in accordance with that definition.

The whistleblower definition operates in conjunction with the three clauses of §78u–6(h)(1)(A) to spell out the provision’s scope. The definition first describes who is eligible for protection—namely, a “whistleblower” who provides pertinent information “to the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6). The three clauses then describe what conduct, when engaged in by a “whistleblower,” is shielded from employment discrimination. An individual who meets both measures may invoke Dodd-Frank’s protections. But an individual who falls outside the protected category of “whistleblowers” is ineligible to seek redress under the statute, regardless of the conduct in which that individual engages. This reading is reinforced by another whistleblower protection provision in Dodd-Frank, see 12 U. S. C. §5567(b), which imposes no requirement that information be conveyed to a government agency. Pp. 9–11.

(b) The Court’s understanding is corroborated by Dodd-Frank’s purpose and design. The core objective of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower program is to aid the Commission’s enforcement efforts by “motivat[ing] people who know of securities law violations to tell the SEC.” S. Rep. No. 111–176, p. 38 (emphasis added). To that end, Congress provided monetary awards to whistleblowers who furnish actionable information to the Commission. Congress also complemented the financial incentives for SEC reporting by heightening protection against retaliation. Pp. 11–12.

(c) Somers and the Solicitor General contend that Dodd-Frank’s “whistleblower” definition applies only to the statute’s award program and not, as the definition plainly states, to its anti-retaliation provision. Their concerns do not support a departure from the statutory text. Pp. 12–18.

(1) They claim that the Court’s reading would vitiate the protections of clause (iii) for whistleblowers who make disclosures to persons and entities other than the SEC. See §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). But the plain-text reading of the statute leaves the third clause with substantial meaning by protecting a whistleblower who reports misconduct both to the SEC and to another entity, but suffers retaliation because of the latter, non-SEC, disclosure. Pp. 13–15.

(2) Nor would the Court’s reading jettison protections for auditors, attorneys, and other employees who are required to report information within the company before making external disclosures. Such employees would be shielded as soon as they also provide relevant information to the Commission. And Congress may well have considered adequate the safeguards already afforded to such employees by Sarbanes-Oxley. Pp. 15–16.

(3) Applying the “whistleblower” definition as written, Somers and the Solicitor General further protest, will allow “identical misconduct” to “go punished or not based on the happenstance of a separate report” to the SEC. Brief for Respondent 37–38. But it is understandable that the statute’s retaliation protections, like its financial rewards, would be reserved for employees who have done what Dodd-Frank seeks to achieve by reporting information about unlawful activity to the SEC. P. 16.

(4) The Solicitor General observes that the statute contains no apparent requirement of a “temporal or topical connection between the violation reported to the Commission and the internal disclosure for which the employee suffers retaliation.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25. The Court need not dwell on related hypotheticals, which veer far from the case at hand. Pp. 16–18.

(5) Finally, the interpretation adopted here would not undermine clause (ii) of §78u–6(h)(1)(A), which prohibits retaliation against a whistleblower for “initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or . . . action of the Commission based upon” information conveyed to the SEC by a whistleblower in accordance with the statute. The statute delegates authority to the Commission to establish the “manner” in which a whistleblower may provide information to the SEC. §78u–6(a)(6). Nothing prevents the Commission from enumerating additional means of SEC reporting, including through testimony protected by clause (ii). P. 18.

(d) Because “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” Chevron, 467 U. S., at 842, deference is not accorded to the contrary view advanced by the SEC in Rule 21F–2. Pp. 18–19.

850 F. 3d 1045, reversed and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BREYER, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which ALITO and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.

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Hurley v. California Department of Parks and Recreation

The Information Practices Act's definition of "record" and "personal information" does not restrict an agency's maintenance of qualifying personal information to only a single, official personnel file at a single location.

Hurley v. California Department of Parks and Recreation - filed Feb. 21, 2018, Fourth District, Div. One
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 814

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Tuesday, February 20, 2018

CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese

The U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals erred in applying a series of inferences it laid out in a 1983 case called International Union, United Auto, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Yard-Man that were later rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in order to find that a collective bargaining agreement was ambiguous. A contract is not ambiguous unless it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and the 6th Circuit's "Yard-Man inferences" cannot generate a reasonable interpretation because they are not "ordinary principles of contract law."

CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese - filed Feb. 20, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 17-515_2c83

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Monday, February 19, 2018

Terris v. Co. of Santa Barbara

Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311 holds that public employees must pursue appropriate internal administrative remedies before filing a civil action against their employer.  Labor Code section 244 does not require a litigant to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a civil action.   Here we hold section 244 applies only to claims before the Labor Commissioner.  It has no effect on the Campbell rule.
          
Plaintiff Shawn Terris appeals a summary judgment in favor of her former employer, defendant County of Santa Barbara (County), in her wrongful termination action.  We conclude, among other things, that:  1) Terris did not exhaust her administrative remedies on her claims that the County terminated her job to discriminate against her in violation of sections 1101, 1102, and 1102.5; [[2) there are no triable issues of fact on Terris’s claim that she was terminated because of her sexual orientation (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a), Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA));]] but 3) the trial court erred by awarding the County costs on the FEHA cause of action.  We affirm in part and reverse in part.

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Friday, February 2, 2018

Kenny v. Wal-Mart Stores

The panel vacated the district court’s order remanding a putative class action to California state court because the district court exceeded its statutory authority in remanding sua sponte based on a non-jurisdictional defect, and because Wal-Mart did not waive its right to remove the action to federal court; and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff filed the putative class action in California state court, challenging Wal-Mart’s policy requiring employees who have suffered workplace-related injuries to submit to drug and/or urine testing. Wal-Mart removed the case to federal court based on jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). The district court sua sponte remanded the action to state court, concluding that Wal-Mart had waived its right to remove the case by filing a demurrer in response to plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in state court.

The panel held that the district court lacked authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to remand sua sponte based on a non-jurisdictional defect.

The panel noted that a defendant “may waive the right to remove to federal court where, after it is apparent that the case is removable, the defendant takes actions in state court that manifest his or her intent to have the matter adjudicated there, and to abandon his or her right to a federal forum.” Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d 1230, 1240 (9th Cir. 1994). The panel held that the district court erred in concluding that Wal-Mart waived its right to remove the case when the FAC did not reveal a basis for removal pursuant to CAFA. The panel also held that Wal-Mart’s choice to file a demurrer, rather than another form of responsive pleading, to plaintiff’s indeterminate FAC did not amount to a waiver of its right to remove. The panel further held that where Wal-Mart removed the case before plaintiff opposed the demurrer and before any hearing was held, clearly Wal-Mart did not manifest an intent to litigate in state court.

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Thursday, February 1, 2018

O'Malley v. Hospitality Staffing Solutions

A negligent undertaking claim could not be subjected to dismissal on summary judgment where it was possible for a reasonable trier to fact to find that a hotel had assumed a duty to have an employee check on a guest and there was a dispute as to whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the guest was incapacitated and needed assistance.

O'Malley v. Hospitality Staffing Solutions - filed Jan. 31, 2018, Fourth District, Div. Three
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 574

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