Monday, April 16, 2018

Powell v. Bear Valley Community Hospital

Powell v. Bear Valley Community Hospital (CA4/1 D072616, field 3/26/18, pub. ord. 4/16/18) Medical Staff Privileges

The Board of Directors (the Board) of Bear Valley Community Hospital (Bear Valley) denied Dr. Robert O. Powell's advancement from provisional to active staff membership and reappointment to Bear Valley's medical staff.  Dr. Powell appeals from the superior court judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate to void the Board's decision and for reinstatement of his medical staff privileges.  We affirm.

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Riske v. Superior Court

Riske v. Superior Court (CA2/7 B283035 4/16/18) Retaliation/Peace Officer Personnel Records

Robert Riske, a retired Los Angeles police officer, sued the City of Los Angeles alleging the Los Angeles Police Department had retaliated against him for protected whistleblower activity by failing to assign or promote him to several positions and selecting instead less qualified candidates.  Riske filed a discovery motion pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 to obtain certain summary personnel records relied on by the City in making assignment and promotion decisions.  After the superior court erroneously ruled those records were not subject to discovery because the officers selected for the positions Riske sought were innocent third parties who had not witnessed or caused Riske’s injury, we issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order denying Riske’s discovery motion and to enter a new order directing the City to produce those records for an in camera inspection in accordance with section 1045.  (See Riske v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 647, 664-665 (Riske I).)

The superior court conducted the in camera hearing and ordered the requested personnel records to be produced in accordance with the parties’ protective order.  However, pursuant to section 1045, subdivision (b)(1), which excludes from disclosure “[i]nformation consisting of complaints concerning conduct occurring more than five years before the event or transaction that is the subject of the litigation” in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the court ordered redaction of all items in those reports concerning conduct that had occurred more than five years before Riske filed his complaint.

Riske again petitioned this court for a writ of mandate directing the superior court to order the City to produce those records without redaction.  In response to our inquiry, both Riske and the City agree that, if section 1045, subdivision (b)’s five-year disclosure bar applies at all, it is measured from the date each officer was promoted instead of Riske—the alleged adverse employment action at issue in the litigation—and not the date Riske filed his complaint, as the superior court ruled.  However, Riske also argues more broadly that section 1045, subdivision (b), which prohibits disclosure of stale complaints against police officers, has no application to the personnel reports sought in this case.  We agree and grant the petition.

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The Police Retirement System of St. Louis v. Page

The Police Retirement System of St. Louis v. Page (CA6 H043220 4/16/18) Antitrust Action on Employee Recruitment/Shareholders’ Derivative Action Statute of Limitations

In this derivative action, shareholders of Google, Inc. allege the corporation was harmed by executives who agreed to refrain from actively recruiting employees working for competitors.  The trial court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion, finding the action barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  We will affirm.

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Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.

Appellant Bernadette Tanguilig brought suit against her former employer, Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (NMG), alleging a combination of individual and class claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and multiple violations of the California Labor Code.  Early in the trial court proceedings, NMG successfully demurred to Tanguilig’s wrongful termination and related claims, and several years later, moved to dismiss the remaining claims pursuant to California’s five-year dismissal statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the suit.  On appeal, Tanguilig urges us to overturn the five-year dismissal order, arguing primarily that the trial court erred in failing to toll the five-year clock under section 583.340, subdivision (c), for the period during which an order compelling co-plaintiff Juan Carlos Pinela to arbitration was in effect.  Tanguilig also appeals an order sustaining NMG’s demurrer and an award of prevailing-party costs to NMG.
          
Finding no merit to any of the assigned errors, we affirm.

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Castillo v. Glenair, Inc.

Castillo v. Glenair, Inc. (CA2/2 B278239 4/16/18) Joint Employer Settlement/Res Judicata

In a joint employer arrangement, can a class of workers bring a lawsuit against a staffing company, settle that lawsuit, and then bring identical claims against the company where they had been placed to work.  We answer no.

This wage and hour putative class action involves the relationship between a temporary staffing company (GCA Services Group, Inc. (GCA)), its employees (appellants Andrew and David Castillo), and its client company (respondent Glenair, Inc.).  The Castillos were employed and paid by GCA to perform work on site at Glenair.  Glenair was authorized to and did record, review, and report the Castillos’ time records to GCA so that the Castillos could be paid.  The Castillos characterize GCA and Glenair as joint employers.  As explained below, the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate both that Glenair and GCA are in privity with one another for purposes of the Castillos’ wage and hour claims, and that Glenair is an agent of GCA with respect to GCA’s payment of wages to its employees who performed services at Glenair.
These findings of privity and agency are significant.  While this case was pending, a separate class action brought against, among others, GCA resulted in a final, court-approved settlement agreement.  (Gomez v. GCA Production Services, Inc. (Super. Ct. San Bernardino County, 2014, No. CIVRS1205657 (Gomez).)  The Gomez settlement agreement contains a broad release barring settlement class members from asserting wage and hour claims such as those alleged here against GCA and its agents.  The Castillos are members of the Gomez settlement class and did not opt out of that settlement.
The Castillos present claims against Glenair involve the same wage and hour claims, for the same work done, covering the same time period as the claims asserted in Gomez.  Thus, because Glenair is in privity with GCA (a defendant in Gomez) and is an agent of GCA, the Gomez settlement bars the Castillos’ claims against Glenair as a matter of law.

The Castillos appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.  As discussed below, however, we conclude summary judgment was proper.







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Tuesday, April 10, 2018

Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro et al.

Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro et al. (US 16–1362 4/2/18) FLSA Overtime Exemption

Respondents, current and former service advisors for petitioner Encino Motorcars, LLC, sued petitioner for backpay, alleging that petitioner violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay them overtime. Petitioner moved to dismiss, arguing that service advisors are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime-pay requirement under 29 U. S. C. §213(b)(10)(A), which applies to “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements.” The District Court agreed and dismissed the suit. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It found the statute ambiguous and the legislative history inconclusive, and it deferred to a 2011 Department of Labor rule that interpreted “salesman” to exclude service advisors. This Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, holding that courts could not defer to the procedurally defective 2011 rule, Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U. S. ___, ___–___ (Encino I), but not deciding whether the exemption covers service advisors, id., at ___. On remand, the Ninth Circuit again held that the exemption does not include service advisors.

Held: Because service advisors are “salesm[e]n . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles,” they are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime-pay requirement. Pp. 5–11.

(a) A service advisor is obviously a “salesman.” The ordinary meaning of “salesman” is someone who sells goods or services, and service advisors “sell [customers] services for their vehicles,” Encino I, supra, at ___. P. 6.

(b) Service advisors are also “primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” “Servicing” can mean either “the action of maintaining or repairing a motor vehicle” or “[t]he action of providing a service.” Oxford English Dictionary 39. Service advisors satisfy both definitions because they are integral to the servicing process. They “mee[t] customers; liste[n] to their concerns about their cars; sugges[t] repair and maintenance services; sel[l] new accessories or replacement parts; recor[d] service orders; follo[w] up with customers as the services are performed (for instance, if new problems are discovered); and explai[n] the repair and maintenance work when customers return for their vehicles.” Encino I, supra, at ___. While service advisors do not spend most of their time physically repairing automobiles, neither do partsmen, who the parties agree are “primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” Pp. 6–7.

(c) The Ninth Circuit invoked the distributive canon—matching “salesman” with “selling” and “partsman [and] mechanic” with “[servicing]”—to conclude that the exemption simply does not apply to “salesm[e]n . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” But the word “or,” which connects all of the exemption’s nouns and gerunds, is “almost always disjunctive.” United States v. Woods, 571 U. S. 31, 45. Using “or” to join “selling” and “servicing” thus suggests that the exemption covers a salesman primarily engaged in either activity.

Statutory context supports this reading. First, the distributive canon has the most force when one-to-one matching is present, but here, the statute would require matching some of three nouns with one of two gerunds. Second, the distributive canon has the most force when an ordinary, disjunctive reading is linguistically impossible. But here, “salesman . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles” is an apt description of a service advisor. Third, a narrow distributive phrasing is an unnatural fit here because the entire exemption bespeaks breadth, starting with “any” and using the disjunctive “or” three times. Pp. 7–9.

(d) The Ninth Circuit also invoked the principle that exemptions to the FLSA should be construed narrowly. But the Court rejects this principle as a guide to interpreting the FLSA. Because the FLSA gives no textual indication that its exemptions should be construed narrowly, they should be given a fair reading. P. 9.

(e) Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on two extraneous sources to support its interpretation—the 1966–1967 Occupational Outlook Handbook and the FLSA’s legislative history—is unavailing. Pp. 9– 11.

845 F. 3d 925, reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.

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Monday, April 9, 2018

Rizo v. Yovino

An employee's prior salary does not constitute a "factor other than sex" upon which a wage differential may be based under the statutory "catchall" exception set forth in 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(d)(1). For purposes of that statute, "any other factor other than sex" is limited to legitimate, job-related factors such as a prospective employee's experience, educational background, ability, or prior job performance.

Rizo v. Yovino - filed April 9, 2018
Cite as 2018 S.O.S. 16-15372

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Friday, April 6, 2018

Jones v. Royal Admin. Svcs.

Jones v. Royal Admin. Svcs. (9th Cir. 15-17328 4/4/18) Vicarious Liability/Telemarketers/Telephone Consumer Protection Act

The panel filed (1) an order amending its opinion and (2) an amended opinion affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant in an action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The panel held that Royal Administration Services, Inc., could not be held liable under the TCPA for several phone calls made by telemarketers employed by All American Auto Protection, Inc., because the telemarketers did not have actual authority to place the unlawful calls, and Royal exercised insufficient control over the manner and means of the work to establish vicarious liability.

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